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FOR RICHER, NOT POORER:
PREMARITAL WAIVERS OF SPOUSAL
SUPPORT IN CALIFORNIA
J. Nicholas Marfori *
California law is fairly straightforward with respect
to premarital agreements that seek to alter community
property rights in the event of a divorce. But it is unclear
and unsettled with respect to those agreements that seek to
limit or waive spousal support. Although California
prohibits courts from enforcing premarital waivers of
spousal support if it would be unconscionable to do so at
the time of enforcements, courts have not articulated a clear
standard for what that means. California made its first
attempt to do so in In re Marriage of Facter. This Article
considers that decision in illustrating how current law,
which does not clearly define unconscionability, allows
courts to arbitrarily decide when such a waiver is fair. This
Article argues that, instead, courts must consider the
balance between freedom of contract and public policy
embodied in the California Family Code. Finally, this
Article concludes by proposing a set of policy-based
guidelines that courts and the legislature can consider in
determining the enforceability of such waivers under
existing law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
California law has evolved to become fairly straightforward with
regard to premarital agreements 1 that seek to alter community
property rights in the event of divorce. 2 Prospective spouses are
generally free to decide which spouse would get the house, the car,
the dog, etc., if the marriage were to end in dissolution. 3 What
remains unclear and unsettled, however, in California premarital
agreement law, is the enforceability of those provisions that seek to
limit or waive spousal support 4 upon dissolution of marriage. 5
Section 1612(c) of the California Family Code 6 prohibits
enforcement of premarital waivers of spousal support if it would be
“unconscionable at the time of enforcement,” 7 but courts have yet to
articulate a clear standard for what that actually means. To illustrate,
suppose George and Jane decide to get married in anticipation of
having a child. Concerned about the wealth he had accumulated over
the years (and Jane’s lack thereof), George conditions the marriage
1. A premarital agreement, also referred to as a prenuptial agreement, is “[a]n agreement
made before marriage [usually] to resolve issues of support and property division if the marriage
ends in divorce or by the death of a spouse.” Prenuptial Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(9th ed. 2009).
2. California law “freely permits contractual variation of the community property regime.”
GRACE GANZ BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 68 (6th ed. 2012); see also
Pre-Marital Agreements: Hearing on SB 78 Before the Assemb. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2001–
02 Reg. Sess. 4–5 (Cal. 2001), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_0051-0100/
sb_78_cfa_20010625_102529_asm_comm.html [hereinafter Hearing on SB 78] (For over 150
years, “California has recognized the right of parties to agree to marriage terms at variance with
[community property] law through pre-marital agreements.”).
3. See Fahi Takesh Hallin, Strategies for Successfully Representing California Clients and
Overcoming Challenges in Family Law Cases, in STRATEGIES FOR FAMILY LAW IN CALIFORNIA:
LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW 73
(2013 ed.) (“Generally, there is no or very little limitation on parties contracting away their right
to community property during the marriage . . . .”).
4. Spousal support, often referred to as maintenance or alimony, and can be defined as “[a]
court-ordered allowance that one spouse pays to the other spouse for maintenance and support
while they are separated, while they are involved in a matrimonial lawsuit, or after they are
divorced.” Alimony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). The duty to support one’s spouse
is statutory. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4300 (West 2014).
5. See Steve Mindel, Succeeding As a California Family Law Practitioner, in STRATEGIES
FOR FAMILY LAW IN CALIFORNIA: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN
CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW 71 (2014 ed.) (Advising family law practitioners to “warn clients that
any modification of spousal support rights remain an unsettled area in family law, and the
drafting of premarital agreements should be approached with caution.”); Hallin, supra note 3, at
73 (recognizing that “the issue of whether or not a waiver of spousal support in a prenuptial
agreement will be valid has been a very hot topic in California for many years.”).
6. Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Family Code in this Article refer to the
California Family Code.
7. FAM. § 1612(c).
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on her signing a premarital agreement that requires her to waive any
right to spousal support if they ever divorced, but also provides for
her to receive $200,000 in lump sum, their Caribbean timeshare, and
their million-dollar marital home to which she made no financial
contribution. Jane agrees. Shortly after the wedding, she quits her
retail job to be a stay-at-home mom, leaving George financially
responsible for Jane, their son, and Jane’s daughter from a previous
marriage. After fifteen years, they separate.
During the divorce proceedings, Jane asks the court for postdissolution spousal support. She admits that she freely and
voluntarily waived her right to spousal support in their premarital
agreement, but she claims that enforcing that waiver would be
unconscionable under section 1612(c). How should the court rule?
Would it be it unconscionable to deny her spousal support, when she
would still receive $200,000, a Caribbean timeshare, and their
million-dollar home? Does it matter that Jane has not worked in
fifteen years, while George makes over $1 million per year? What if
George makes only $500,000 per year? What if George lost his job
during the marriage? Would it matter if their marriage lasted only
fifteen weeks instead of fifteen years?
In In re Marriage of Facter, 8 the California Court of Appeal
made its first attempt to delineate the circumstances in which
enforcement of a premarital waiver of spousal support would be
unconscionable. There, Nancy Facter waived her right to spousal
support in a premarital agreement. 9 In deciding whether or not to
enforce the waiver, the court noted that Nancy was entitled to receive
$200,000, a Jaguar automobile, and a fifty-percent interest in their
marital home from her ex-husband. 10 Nevertheless, the court found
that “[c]ompared to what she is likely to receive in court-ordered
spousal support, these assets [were] manifestly inadequate.” 11 The
court had “little difficulty” concluding that the spousal support
waiver was unconscionable, given that her ex-husband Jeffrey was

8. 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79 (Ct. App. 2013).
9. Id. at 84–85. Paragraph No. 3 of the Property Rights section of the agreement stated that
Paragraph No. 2 would “constitute [Nancy’s] sole right to property acquired during marriage and
to support . . . .” Id. at 83–84. Paragraph No. 6 in the Child Support section of the agreement
provided that “nothing in his conditional . . . ‘shall give rise to any other obligations to pay of the
housing of [Nancy], spousal support, or additional sums of child support.’” Id. at 83.
10. Id. at 93.
11. Id.
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worth over $10 million with earnings of $1 million per year, while
Nancy had no separate property and no income coming out of the
marriage. 12 Said succinctly, the court decided that Nancy deserved
more and that Jeffrey could pay more.
To be clear, this Article does not suggest that the Court of
Appeals was wrong (or right) in finding that the waiver in Facter
was unconscionable. Nor does it probe for some mathematical
formula to determine unconscionability. Instead, this Article seeks to
address several important questions that have remained unanswered
since the enactment of Family Code section 1612(c) and continue to
remain unanswered even after Facter. For instance, what is the
standard for determining whether a spousal support waiver is
unconscionable at the time of enforcement? Is the waiver
unconscionable simply because it later turns out to be unfair? Should
spousal support waivers be treated as any other type of contractual
waiver with regard to unconscionability? Perhaps the broader inquiry
underlying these questions is whether the courts, through this
unconscionability approach, should be able to invalidate a premarital
contract term when they find it to be more favorable to one party
over the other, and if so, why?
Part II of this Article explores the historical development of
California law on premarital waivers of spousal support. Part III
takes a closer look at Facter to illustrate how the current law
precluding enforcement of spousal support waivers found to be
unconscionable, without a clear standard for determining
unconscionability, allows courts to arbitrarily evaluate the
substantive fairness of such waivers. Drawing upon contract law
principles and policy considerations that arise when prospective
spouses attempt to modify their legal obligations under marriage,
Part IV argues that a court’s unconscionability determination must
consider the delicate balance between freedom of contract and public
policy embodied in section 1612(c) of the Family Code. Part V
explains why the spousal support waiver provision in the recently
promulgated Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act of
2012 13 fails to strike such a balance, and proposes a set of policybased guidelines for judicial or legislative consideration regarding
the enforceability of such waivers under the existing law.
12. Id.
13. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT, 9C U.L.A. 12 (Supp. 2014).
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF CALIFORNIA LAW ON
SPOUSAL SUPPORT WAIVERS
Premarital agreements have long been used to delineate the
property rights between spouses during the marriage 14 and to
regulate the disposition of property upon the death of one of the
spouses. 15 In the 1970s, as the number of divorces increased in the
advent of “no-fault” divorce legislation and changing attitudes
towards marriage, California courts began recognizing and enforcing
premarital agreements in contemplation of divorce. 16 With regard to
property rights, spouses were freely permitted to “agree to marriage
terms at variance with [community property] law . . . unless they
violated general contractual concepts of fraud, duress, or undue
influence, or otherwise were contrary to public policy.” 17 Yet during
that time, courts remained hesitant to enforce provisions waiving or
limiting spousal support due to public policy concerns against
promoting divorce. 18
A. Early Case Law on Spousal Support Waivers
The first major decision in California involving spousal support
waivers rested heavily on public policy concerns. In In re Marriage
of Higgason, 19 decided in 1973, a husband and wife entered into a
premarital agreement in which each spouse waived “any and all right
14. See BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 67 (“To insulate daughters from the operation of the
[English] common law, wealthy English families created trusts for a wife’s separate benefit and
negotiated premarital contracts that gave a wife control of her property during marriage.”).
15. Id. (“[P]remarital agreements have served the needs of older persons, often widows and
widowers, who wish to remarry but also to safeguard the family patrimony for the children of a
prior marriage. Originally, such contracts regulated the disposition of property upon the death of
one of the parties.”). Such agreements were once “regarded with distrust and hostility” for being
within “the province of the wealthy, the age disparate, the heartless, or the simply greedy.”
Allison Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV.
887, 888 (1998); see also Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 4–5 (“[Premarital] agreements
normally have been considered enforceable unless they violated general contractual concepts of
fraud, duress, or undue influence, or otherwise were contrary to public policy.”).
16. CHARLOTTE K. GOLDBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY 69 (2014); see also BLUMBERG,
supra note 2, at 68 (“As the frequency of divorces increased, attorneys began to insert divorce
provisions in premarital agreements.”); Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 5 (“As economic
conditions, attitudes toward marriage, and views on the status of men and women changed over
the latter half of the twentieth century, the use of pre-marital agreements also has increased.”).
17. Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 5.
18. Michelle Butler, Part Two: Alimony and the Marriage Contract: California Premarital
Agreements Waiving or Specifying Spousal Support Obligations, 20 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
41, 41 (2009).
19. 516 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1973) disapproved by In re Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 327
(Cal. 1976).
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for contribution to the support, maintenance and expenses of the
other party.” 20 At the time they were married, the wife was a
seventy-three-year-old woman with “substantial assets,” whereas the
husband, at forty-eight, was “earning $2 an hour plus tips, and had
little or no means.” 21 About halfway through their two-year
marriage, the husband began incurring substantial medical and
hospitalization costs after being beaten by an unknown assailant,
having a lung surgically removed due to lung cancer, and suffering a
heart attack that left him disabled. 22 The trial court denied the
husband’s request for temporary spousal support of $2,500 per
month and other post-dissolution financial benefits based on its
conclusion that the premarital agreement precluded him from
receiving such support. 23
The California Supreme Court remanded, holding that the
premarital agreement was void against public policy and, therefore,
did not preclude the court from awarding support to the husband.24
Recognizing a distinction between agreements relating to the
disposition of property and those that seek to “vary the personal
duties and obligations to each other which result from the marriage
contract itself,” 25 the court articulated the bright line rule that “[a]ny
attempt by the parties to diminish or waive this obligation in an
antenuptial agreement is unenforceable.” 26 The court reasoned that
because contracts containing spousal support waivers would
“facilitate divorce or separation by providing for a settlement only in
the event of such an occurrence,” such contracts would not be “in
contemplation that marriage relation will continue until the parties
are separated by death” and would, therefore, be void against public
policy. 27
Shortly thereafter, in In re Marriage of Dawley, 28 the California
Supreme Court revisited its ruling in Higgason when it upheld the
validity of a premarital agreement in which the parties, both of whom
planned the early dissolution of their marriage, agreed to keep their
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 290–91.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 292–93.
See id. at 295–98.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 295.
Id.
551 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1976).
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earnings and other property acquired during marriage as separate
property. 29 In her request for court-ordered support, the wife relied
on Higgason to argue that the premarital agreement as a whole was
invalid as against public policy because it was not “made in
contemplation that the marriage relation will continue until the
parties are separated by death.” 30 The court disagreed, however,
clarifying that a premarital agreement “violates state policy favoring
marriage only insofar as its terms encourage or promote dissolution,”
and that the parties’ anticipation of an early termination of their
marriage was irrelevant to the enforceability of the agreement. 31
Finding that the spousal support provision neither waived nor limited
financial support to the wife, but instead guaranteed her a minimum
amount of support, the court held that the agreement did not violate
public policy and was therefore enforceable. 32
B. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Pendleton
When it first codified statutory law regarding premarital
agreements, the California Legislature contemplated the prevailing
public policy against contractual limitation of spousal support
articulated in Higgason and Dawley. 33 In 1985, California became
the first state to adopt the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
(UPAA), 34 which was promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to address the “substantial
uncertainty as to the enforceability . . . of [premarital] agreements
and [the] significant lack of uniformity of treatment of these
agreements among the states.” 35 When bill was first proposed in the
California State Senate, it contained all sections of the model code
almost word for word. 36 However, after considering testimony in
opposition of the UPAA sections regarding spousal support, the bill
was enacted without the provisions that allowed for premarital
29. Id. at 325.
30. Id. at 325.
31. Id. at 329–30.
32. Id. at 331.
33. See Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 2 (at the time of enactment of the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act, “California case law considered the waiver of spousal support to be
void as against public policy, because public policy favored the protection of marriage and the
waiver of spousal support was believed to encourage dissolution.”).
34. Charlotte K. Goldberg, “If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It”: Premarital Agreements and
Spousal Support Waivers in California, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2000).
35. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 36 (1983).
36. See Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 5.
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modification or elimination of spousal support. 37
The California Legislature explained that by deleting the two
spousal support provisions from its version of the UPAA, “California
case law would continue to prevail on the issue of spousal support in
premarital agreements.” 38 Some commentators understood that, by
omitting those provisions, the Legislature “intended to preclude
predetermination of spousal support upon divorce” as against public
policy in favor of marriage. 39 Others, however, viewed that the
Legislature’s omission of the support provisions left open the
question of whether the courts should continue to follow prior case
law (Higgason and Dawley) on the enforceability of spousal support
waivers, or whether the Act should be read to allow the courts
discretion in allowing or prohibiting such waivers. 40 The Supreme
Court took fifteen years to address this issue in its decision in
Fifteen years later, in In re Marriage of Pendleton, 41 the
California Supreme Court recognized that “changes in the law
governing the spousal relation warrant[ed] the reexamination of the
assumptions and policy underlying the refusal to enforce waivers of
spousal support.” 42 In Pendleton, a husband and wife, each of whom
had considerable assets to their name and elevated earning capacities
at the time of dissolution, 43 entered into a premarital agreement in
which they each waived “all rights to any type of spousal support or

37. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(4), 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983) (“Parties to a
premarital agreement may contract with respect to . . . the modification or elimination of spousal
support.”). But see Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 5 (“After hearing testimony opposing the
bill’s waiver provisions on several grounds . . . the Legislature deleted the two provisions
permitting waiver of spousal support before enacting the rest of the UPAA into law.”); Butler,
supra note 18, at 42 n.6 (“[O]pposition from the Women Lawyers Association of Los Angeles
and others led the Family Law Section [of the California State Bar] to condition its support [of
the bill] on the elimination of the provision allowing the waiver of spousal support.”).
38. Butler, supra note 18, at 42 (quoting ASSEMBLY SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON SB 1143, S.B. 1143, 1985–86 Reg. Sess., at 3 (1985)).
39. Goldberg, supra note 34, at 1253; see also Robert H. Martin, Waivers of Spousal
Support in Premarital Agreements, 1 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 475, 487 (1993) (“The legislature has
spoken. And the California courts have made clear their intentions. In California, the courts will
continue to apply case law and will hold waivers of spousal support void as against public
policy.”).
40. Butler, supra note 18, at 42–43.
41. 5 P.3d 839 (Cal. 2000).
42. Id. at 845.
43. Id. at 840. At the time of their divorce, each spouse was worth approximately $2.5
million. The husband held a doctorate in pharmacology and a law degree, while the wife held a
master’s degree and was earning $5,772 per month in Social Security benefits, investment
returns, and rental income. Id.
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child support from the other” in the event of divorce. 44 Both parties,
represented by independent counsel in the negotiation and
preparation of the agreement, understood its legal consequences and
executed it freely and voluntarily. 45
Despite having satisfied the statutory procedural requirements,
the trial court found the waiver to be void as against public policy,
and it ordered the husband to pay temporary spousal support of
$8,500 per month. 46 The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded on
the ground that “the current state of family law is one that ‘should
not per se prohibit premarital spousal support waivers or
limitations.’” 47 The California Supreme Court agreed, concluding
that:
[N]o public policy is violated by permitting enforcement of
a waiver of spousal support executed by intelligent, welleducated persons, each of whom appears to be selfsufficient in property and earning ability, and both of whom
have the advice of counsel regarding their rights and
obligations as marital partners at the time they execute the
waiver. 48
Noting that section 1612(a)(7) of the Family Code expressly
permits premarital agreements as to “any other matter, including
their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public
policy,” 49 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 50
In the majority opinion, Justice Baxter noted that the California
version of the UPAA, as it was introduced, contained provisions that
would have permitted waivers of spousal support but were
subsequently deleted by amendment. 51 In his view, the omission of
44. The spousal support waiver was worded as follows: “[B]oth parties now and forever
waive, in the event of a dissolution of the marriage, all rights to any type of spousal support . . .
from the other.” Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 840–41 (explaining that in determining the amount of support to be ordered, the
court took note of the couple’s “$20,000 to $32,000 per month” lifestyle).
47. Id. at 841 (quoting In re Marriage of Pendleton, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840, 845 (Ct. App.
1998), aff’d, 5 P.3d 839 (Cal. 2000)).
48. Id. at 848.
49. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(a)(7) (stating that in addition to those subject matters expressly
enumerated in subsections (a)(1) through (a)(6), “[p]arties to a premarital agreement may contract
with respect to . . . [a]ny other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in
violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty”).
50. Pendleton, 5 P.3d at 849.
51. Id. 849–50.
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those provisions evinced the Legislature’s intention to “leave the law
as it was in 1985,” but he found it to be “unreasonable to assume that
the Legislature intended the common law of the 19th century to
govern the marital relationship in the 21st century.” 52 Justice Baxter
understood the Legislature to have been “satisfied with the evolution
of the common law governing premarital waivers of spousal support
and intended that evolution to continue.” 53 In light of that
interpretation, the court found that “the common law policy, based
on assumptions that dissolution of marriage is contrary to public
policy and that premarital waivers of spousal support may promote
dissolution, [was] anachronistic.” 54
The Pendleton court took a significant step towards the
common-law recognition of spousal support waivers by overruling
Higgason, but it also called for legislative action on the matter. In its
opinion, the majority expressly invited the Legislature to impose
limitations on the right to waive spousal support and/or to specify the
circumstances in which enforcement of a waiver would be unjust. 55
Less than one year later, the invitation was accepted. 56
C. The Pendulum Swings After Pendleton
In 2001, Senate Bill 78 amended section 1612 of the Family
Code to expressly permit premarital waivers of spousal support. As it
was introduced, however, the bill contained language to prohibit
such waivers, which the author intended to operate as a direct
legislative response to nullify the Pendleton holding. 57 According to
the author of the bill, the Pendleton court “fundamentally
52. Id. (explaining that the “common law of the 19th century” imposed a blanket prohibition
against premarital waivers of spousal support because such waivers were found to encourage
divorce); see In re Marriage of Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 295 (Cal. 1973); Barham v. Barham, 202
P.2d 289 (Cal. 1949); Whiting v. Whiting, 216 P. 92 (Cal. 1923).
53. Pendleton, 5 P.3d at 845.
54. Id. at 845.
55. Id. at 839 n.12 (“The Legislature may, of course, limit the right to enter into premarital
waivers of spousal support and/or specify the circumstances in which enforcement should be
denied.”).
56. See Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 5.
57. Id. (“[T]he right of a child or a spouse to support may not be adversely affected by a
premarital agreement.”) (emphasis omitted). The bill was also proposed in response the California
Supreme Court’s decision in In re Marriage of Bonds, which held that the lack of representation
by independent counsel at the execution of a premarital agreement was only one factor in
determining voluntariness of a premarital agreement. 5 P.3d 815, 828 (Cal. 2000). However, this
Article focuses specifically on spousal support waivers and the court’s evaluation of substantive
fairness thereof at the time of enforcement.
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misinterpreted the Legislature’s intent” in omitting the spousal
support provisions from its version of the UPAA. 58 But after the bill
met opposition from various organizations and individuals, 59 an
amended version was proposed that allowed enforcement of such
waivers on a case-by-case basis so long as certain conditions were
met; the amended version passed almost unanimously. 60 As it was
ultimately enacted, the support provision of Senate Bill 78—now
codified in subsection (c) of Family Code section 1612—provides:
Any provision in a premarital agreement regarding spousal
support, including, but not limited to, a waiver of it, is not
enforceable if the party against whom enforcement of the
spousal support provision is sought was not represented by
independent counsel at the time the agreement containing
the provision was signed, or if the provision regarding
spousal support is unconscionable at the time of
enforcement. 61
Although the bill as enacted did not prohibit waivers of spousal
support as its author originally intended, it created two obstacles for
those seeking to enforce such waivers in court. 62 The first part of the
rule, which requires representation by independent counsel at the
time of signing, operates as a procedural safeguard to ensure
voluntariness at the time of execution of the waiver. The second part,
however, is substantive in nature in that it expressly prohibits
enforcement of waivers that are shown to be unconscionable at the
time of enforcement. 63
This Article centers on the unconscionability standard set forth
58. Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 5.
59. Id. at 6 (explaining that the bill, as introduced, met opposition from the Coalition of
Parent Support and other individuals who argued that a statutory prohibition on spousal support
waivers is “paternalistic, demeans adult women who should be able to enter a premarital
agreement as freely as any other contract, discourages second marriages by men already carrying
an unfair spousal support burden, and is contrary to the laws of 40 other states and the District of
Columbia”).
60. Complete Bill History, S.B. 78, 2001–02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002), http://www.leginfo.
ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_0051-0100/sb_78_bill_20010912_history.html (last visited Mar. 4,
2015) (detailing that the bill was passed with thirty-nine ayes to zero noes in the Senate, and
sixty-one ayes to six noes in the assembly).
61. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (West 2014).
62. See also John G. Gherini, The California Supreme Court Swings and Misses in Defining
the Scope and Enforceability of Premarital Agreements, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 151, 171 (2001)
(explaining that the amendment “adds significant protections to a party who benefits from spousal
support”).
63. FAM. § 1612(c).
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in the second part of the rule because, as illustrated in In re Marriage
Facter, 64 this standard gives courts significant discretion in
evaluating the substantive fairness of spousal support waivers. 65
Furthermore, it allows courts to determine the enforceability of a
waiver by considering the circumstances existing at the time the
waiver is to be enforced, as opposed to the time of its execution. 66
III. IN RE MARRIAGE OF FACTER: PAINTING A PICTURE OF THE
UNCONSCIONABLE WAIVER
The enactment of Senate Bill 78 amended California law to
provide, among other things, that “[a]ny provision in a premarital
agreement regarding spousal support, including, but not limited to, a
waiver of it, is not enforceable . . . if the provision regarding spousal
support is unconscionable at the time of enforcement.” 67 In In re
Marriage of Facter, the California Court of Appeal made its first
attempt to paint a picture of what an unconscionable waiver of
spousal support looks like at the time of enforcement. 68 As one
practitioner noted, In re Marriage of Facter is “the most remarkable
case involving premarital agreements to come along in over a
decade, and the family law bench and bar are going to be dealing
with the fallout from it for years to come.” 69
A. The Agreement, the Disagreement, and the Decision
When Nancy met Jeffrey in 1990, she had a part-time job selling
shoes at Nordstrom, and Jeffrey was a partner at a law firm. 70 Jeffrey
was a Harvard graduate; Nancy had a high school diploma. 71 Jeffrey
64. 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79 (Ct. App. 2013). For a discussion of Facter, see infra, Part III.
65. See Butler, supra note 18, at 46 (“In determining which support arrangements are
‘unconscionable’ at the time of divorce, the legislature seems to have relegated considerable
space to common-law development and treatment of these agreements.”).
66. This type of provision has been referred to as a “second-look” provision. DAVID
WESTFALL ET AL., ESTATE PLANNING LAW AND TAXATION § 11.05(1)(a)(i) (4th ed. 2014).
67. FAM. § 1612(c).
68. Id. at 79. Although it is of no significant consequence to this analysis, it is important to
note that the Facter court did not directly refer to Family Code section 1612(c) when it made its
ruling on unconscionability, but instead referred to the language from Pendleton. Id. This is
because the statute does not apply retroactively to premarital agreements executed before the
statute was enacted. See In re Marriage of Rosendale, 115 P. 3d 417 (Cal. 2005); In re Marriage
of Howell, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 539 (Ct. App. 2011).
69. Brian J. Kramer, Dealing with the Fallout from In re Marriage of Facter, BRIAN J.
KRAMER P.C. FAMILY LAW (Sept. 23, 2013), http://bjkpc.com/2/featured-blog/.
70. In re Facter, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 86.
71. Id. at 92.
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began providing financial support for Nancy as their relationship
progressed. 72 He bought her a used car and financed her real estate
licensing course. 73 When Nancy stopped working, Jeffrey became
solely responsible for the living expenses of Nancy and her two
children from a prior marriage. 74 When they purchased their home in
Mill Valley, they took title in joint tenancy, even though Nancy did
not contribute any money towards the purchase. 75
The couple decided to get married in contemplation of having
their first child together. 76 According to Nancy, “Jeffrey wanted to
have a child but Nancy told him she would not do so outside of
marriage.” 77 Nancy had already been involved in divorce litigation
with her prior husband 78 that included disputes regarding support and
attorney fees; 79 she was familiar with “laws on community property,
support, and support arrearages.” 80 Jeffrey expressed to Nancy his
concern about protecting his earnings and conditioned the marriage
on her signing a premarital agreement, which he would prepare
himself. 81
On November 7, 1994, the day before their wedding, Jeffrey and
Nancy entered into a premarital agreement (the “Agreement”). 82 The
Agreement declared that Jeffrey’s separate property (valued at
approximately $3 million at the time) and his earnings of between
$475,000 and $700,000 before the marriage, were to be kept out of
Nancy’s reach. 83 Also, because the Agreement opted out of
community property rights, all property acquired during marriage by
each spouse would be his or her own separate property. 84 In the
event of divorce or permanent separation, however, Jeffrey promised
to give Nancy $100,000 up front, and an additional $100,000 if the

72. Id. at 84.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 86.
76. See id. at 85.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 86.
79. Id. at 86 n.11.
80. Id. at 86.
81. Id. at 85 (“[Jeffrey] told [Nancy] he was afraid of marriage because he had worked hard
all his life, had earned a lot of money, and wanted all that he had earned prior to marriage to be
protected.”).
82. Id. at 83 (“The parties married the day after they signed the Agreement.”).
83. Id. at 82.
84. See id.
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marriage lasted at least fifteen years and if he was a partner at his
firm for more than seven years during the marriage. 85 Nancy was
also to receive at divorce half of the value of the marital estate (after
reimbursement of the down payment, costs, fees and taxes to
Jeffrey), all of the home’s furnishings, and the Jaguar automobile. 86
The Agreement also contained a waiver of spousal support. 87
The couple separated after sixteen years of marriage. 88 In her
motion for temporary support and attorney fees, Nancy argued that
the document did not contain a spousal support waiver. 89 Jeffrey
opposed, relying on two provisions to argue that a spousal support
waiver was contemplated in the agreement: (1) the provision that his
promise to continue paying the mortgage, taxes, and insurance on the
marital home “shall [not] give rise to any other obligations to pay for
the housing of [Nancy], spousal support, or additional sums for child
support”; (2) the provision stating that the assets enumerated in
Paragraph No. 2 “constitute [Nancy’s] sole right to property acquired
during the marriage and to support.” 90 The trial court granted
Nancy’s motion for temporary support and attorney fees and costs,
and in response, Jeffrey abandoned his efforts to enforce the spousal
support waiver. 91 Jeffrey instead focused his argument on the
severability clause in the Agreement, which would require the
property-related provisions of the Agreement to be honored despite
the invalid waiver. 92 Yet his abandonment of the waiver claim did
not prevent the trial court from finding the spousal support waiver to
be unconscionable, and using that finding to invalidate the entire
agreement as unenforceable. 93
On appeal, the court agreed that the there was an invalid,
unconscionable waiver of spousal support in the Agreement, 94 but it
85. Id. at 83.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 89. Although there was some dispute as to whether the Agreement actually
contained a spousal support waiver, the court ultimately found that a spousal support waiver
existed in Paragraph No. 3 of the Agreement.
88. Id. at 82–83. The parties married in 1994 and separated in 2010.
89. Id. at 83.
90. Id. at 83–84 (second and third alterations in original).
91. Id. at 84.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 87–88.
94. Id. at 93. Although this Article is narrowly concerned with unconscionability at the time
of enforcement, it is important to note that the appellate court in Facter also discussed at length
whether the spousal support waiver was unconscionable at the time of execution based on the
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found that the trial court erred in refusing to sever the invalid
provisions. 95 In deciding whether the spousal support waiver was
unconscionable at the time of enforcement, the court acknowledged
that, under the Agreement, Nancy was already entitled to receive
$200,000, the Jaguar automobile, and a fifty-percent interest in their
marital home. 96 Nevertheless, according to Judge Margulies, these
assets were “manifestly inadequate” when “[c]ompared to what she
[was] likely to receive in court-ordered spousal support.” 97 After all,
Jeffrey owned separate property valued at $10 million and earned an
annual income of $1 million per year, while Nancy had neither
income nor separate property to her name. 98 Thus, the court had
“little difficulty” concluding that the waiver of spousal support was
unconscionable. 99
B. The Facter Aftermath
Although the Facter court identified factual circumstances that
would make a spousal support waiver unconscionable, it neglected to
articulate a clear standard from which it decided that those
circumstances amounted to unconscionability. 100 The court simply
decided that $200,000, a Jaguar automobile, and a fifty-percent
ownership interest in a multi-million-dollar home was not enough in
light of Jeffrey’s net worth and annual income. 101
To clarify, this Article does not suggest that Facter was
incorrectly decided. Nor does it suggest that a monetary imbalance
between the parties is irrelevant to the inquiry. However, the court’s
mathematical approach in Facter provides little guidance as to what
constitutes unconscionability, perhaps because it would be difficult,

circumstances around the time Nancy signed the agreement. See id. at 90–92. Finding that “there
was a great disparity in the parties’ respective incomes and assets at the time they entered into the
Agreement” and that a “significant inequality of bargaining power” was evidenced by the fact
that Jeffrey drafted the Agreement and told Nancy that the spousal support waiver was not
negotiable, the court concluded that the waiver was unconscionable at the time of execution. See
id. at 92.
95. Id. at 99.
96. Id. at 93.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Request for Partial Depublication at 2, In re Marriage of Facter, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79
(Ct. App. 2013) (No. A134191), http://www.walzermelcher.com/articles-prenup/Req-for-PartialDepublish.pdf.
101. In re Facter, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 93–94 & n.26.
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if not impossible, to attach a mathematical formula to
unconscionability. If Jeffrey had promised $500,000 to Nancy
instead of only $200,000, would the support waiver still be
unconscionable? What about $700,000? What if he promised her full
ownership interest in their home rather than only fifty percent?
The lack of a clear and objective standard for determining
unconscionability makes it difficult for prospective spouses to
predict the enforceability of such waivers and leads to unnecessary
litigation. 102 But in a broader sense, the Facter decision illustrates
the prevailing issue with California’s unconscionability approach on
spousal support waivers: a rule that bars enforcement of support
waivers found to be unconscionable at the time of enforcement,
without proper guidance for determining unconscionability, allows
courts to arbitrarily evaluate the substantive fairness of such waivers.
This Article seeks to resolve this issue by proposing a clear and
objective set of guidelines for determining whether a premarital
waiver of spousal support is unconscionable at the time of
enforcement. 103 To that end, the following part of this Article
discusses the contract law principles and policy considerations that
arise when prospective spouses attempt to waive spousal support
obligations before marriage.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY VS. FREEDOM OF MARITAL CONTRACT
Contractual autonomy often conflicts with public policy
considerations when prospective spouses attempt to modify or waive
their legal rights and obligations before marriage. 104 Under the
bargain principle of contracts, “parties should be bound to honor
agreements to which they truly consented at an earlier time.” 105 The
underlying premise is that “[c]ontracts would not serve their function
of allocating the risk of future events if the law were to decline
enforcement of an agreement merely because the future turned out
102. See Request for Partial Depublication, supra note 100, at 2; Peter M. Walzer, The
Gender Factor of Marriage of Facter, L.A. LAW., May 2013, at 44, 44 (“[A] vague standard as to
the meaning of the word ‘unconscionability’ will lead to considerable litigation over the
enforceability of prenups.”).
103. See infra Part V.B.
104. See Request for Partial Depublication, supra note 100, at 2 (“There is a natural tension
between freedom of contract and the court’s role in protecting spouses in need of spousal
support.”).
105. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05 cmt. a
(2002).
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less favorably than one of the contracting parties expected.” 106 On
the other hand, however, “social policy seeks to assure a fair
allocation of the gains and losses when the marriage relationship
ends.” 107 As noted by the California Legislature, “agreements
between prospective spouses occupy a unique area of law and policy,
involve emotional relationships far different than those between most
contracting parties, and thereby merit a unique approach.” 108 The
following sections explain how this unique approach took form in the
careful balancing of freedom of contract and public policy concerns
with regard to the ability of prospective spouses to contractually
modify or waive their legal rights and obligations before marriage.
A. Public Policy in Favor of Marriage
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA) 109 has been
adopted by twenty-six states since its promulgation in 1983; 110
roughly half of those states have made significant amendments. 111
Although, California was the first state to adopt the UPAA in 1985,
the Legislature omitted the provisions that permitted spousal support
waivers in premarital agreements 112 because California case law at
that time considered such waivers to be against public policy

106. Id.
107. Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching for
Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253, 256 (1989).
108. CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., BILL ANALYSIS OF SB 78: PREMARITAL
AGREEMENTS, S.B. 78, 2001–02 Reg. Sess., at 7 (Cal. 2001), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/
01-02/bill/sen/sb_0051-0100/sb_78_cfa_20010425_100434_sen_comm.html.
109. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1, 9C U.L.A. 39 (1983).
110. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9C U.L.A. 35 (1983).
111. J. Thomas Oldham, Would Enactment of the Uniform Premarital and Marital
Agreements Act in All Fifty States Change U.S. Law Regarding Premarital Agreements?, 46
FAM. L.Q. 367, 371 (2012) (“Thirteen states adopted the UPAA without modifications, while
twelve states enacted it with modifications that almost always made it easier for a spouse to
challenge an agreement.”).
112. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(4), 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983) (providing
that “[p]arties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to . . . the modification or
elimination of spousal support.”); UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b), 9C U.L.A. 43
(1983) (providing that “[i]f a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal
support and that modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for
support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital dissolution, a
court . . . may require the other party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that
eligibility.”). But see CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 108, at 22 (“After hearing
testimony opposing the bill’s waiver provisions on several grounds . . . the Legislature deleted the
two provisions permitting waiver of spousal support before enacting the rest of the UPAA into
law.”).
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favoring the protection of marriage. 113 This common-law doctrine
was based on the assumption that “the state had a vital interest in and
should act to ensure the permanency of the marriage relation.” 114
In Pendleton, the court recognized that “changes in the
relationship between spouses and support obligations in
particular . . . clearly warrant[ed] reassessment of what remains of
the rule that premarital waivers of spousal support may promote
dissolution and, if they do so, are unenforceable.” 115 Under this
premise, the court took a significant step toward contractual
autonomy between spouses by lifting the blanket prohibition on
premarital waivers of spousal support, concluding that “a premarital
waiver of spousal support does not offend contemporary public
policy” so long as it is “entered into voluntarily by parties who are
aware of the effect of the agreement.” 116 Justice Baxter made clear,
however, that “[p]ublic policy continues to favor and encourage
marriage.” 117
B. Policy of Protecting Spousal Support
As previously noted, when Senate Bill 78 was first introduced in
2001, it was intended “to legislatively confirm that waivers of
spousal support in premarital agreements are void as against public
policy.” 118 According to its author, Senator Sheila Kuehl,
“[p]reserving spousal support as a protection against the unknown
circumstances at the end of a marriage . . . is an important policy
goal justifying the continued prohibition of spousal support waivers
in premarital agreements.” 119 This policy goal of preserving spousal
support remained an important consideration even after the bill was
amended in the Assembly to expressly permit premarital waivers of
spousal support.
Supporters of the amended version of Senate Bill 78, now
113. CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 108, at 2 (“At that time, California case
law considered the waiver of spousal support to be void as against public policy, because public
policy favored the protection of marriage and the waiver of spousal support was believed to
encourage dissolution.”). See, e.g., Barham v. Barham, 202 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1949); Whiting v.
Whiting, 216 P. 92 (Cal. 1923).
114. In re Marriage of Pendleton, 5 P.3d 839, 847 (Cal. 2000).
115. Id. at 848.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 847.
118. CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 108, at 5; see supra Part II.C.
119. CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 108, at 6.
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codified as section 1612(c) of the Family Code, recognized that
“spousal support, and the role that it can play at the time a marriage
is ending, is worthy of some special protection.” 120 That special
protection took form as two foundational requirements that must be
met for a spousal support waiver to be enforceable: First, the waiving
spouse must have been represented by independent counsel at the
time of execution. 121 This provision functions as a procedural
safeguard to ensure voluntariness at the time of execution of the
waiver. Second, the support waiver must not be unconscionable at
the time of enforcement. 122 This provision allows courts to evaluate
the substantive fairness of the waiver at the time enforcement is
sought, not at the time the waiver was executed. Therefore, the
statute gives prospective spouses contractual autonomy to modify
their rights and obligations to each other, subject to procedural and
substantive limitations reflecting the prevailing policy goal of
preserving spousal support.
C. Public Policy Considerations in the Facter Decision
As illustrated in the Facter decision, the unconscionability
approach set forth by Senate Bill 78 allows courts to evaluate the
substantive fairness of a premarital waiver of spousal support at the
time of enforcement, even when all procedural requirements have
been met at the time of execution of that waiver. And as explained in
this part, the substantive review of fairness is justified by public
policy concerns embodied in existing California law. The prevailing
issue with the court’s decision in Facter, however, is that it neglected
to articulate the policy considerations that justified its substantial
review of the spousal support waiver in the premarital agreement.
Nor did it require Nancy, the party contesting enforcement of the
waiver, to prove that these policy concerns were existent. Instead, the
court focused largely on Jeffrey’s net worth and earning capacity
(and Nancy’s lack thereof) to rationalize its decision to invalidate
Nancy’s waiver of spousal support. 123

120.
121.
122.
123.

Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 10.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (West 2014).
See id.
In re Marriage of Facter, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79, 93 (Ct. App. 2013).
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V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ENFORCEABILITY
Since the promulgation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act (UPAA) in 1983, 124 states have taken widely varying approaches
to the enforceability of provisions in premarital agreements that limit
or waive spousal support. 125 In some states, prospective spouses have
significant discretion to waive or limit spousal support before
marriage. For instance, the Texas version of the UPAA omits section
6(b), 126 which gives courts discretion to decline enforcement of
support waivers that would cause the waiving party to be eligible for
public assistance programs. 127 Similarly, non-UPAA states such as
South Carolina and Florida have enforced spousal support waivers
even where one party would become a public charge, so long as it
was foreseeable for it to occur at the time of execution. 128 On the
other hand, some states, such as Iowa, South Dakota, and New
Mexico, do not permit any modification or limitation on spousal
support in premarital agreements. 129
In the middle of the spectrum are those states that impose
specific limitations on enforceability of premarital waivers of spousal
support. In Colorado, for instance, a support waiver will not be
enforced if the waiving party would be left unable to provide for his
or her reasonable post-divorce needs. 130 Indiana considers whether
enforcement of the waiver would result in “extreme hardship” to one
party, while Illinois probes for any “undue hardship” arising out of
any unforeseen change of circumstances during the marriage. 131
Several states have joined California in prohibiting enforcement of
waivers found to be unconscionable at the time of divorce, including
Connecticut, New Jersey, and North Dakota. 132

124. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983).
125. WESTFALL ET AL., supra note 66, ¶ 11.05[1][a][i].
126. Id. ¶ 11.05[1][b].
127. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b), 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983).
128. J. Thomas Oldham, With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow, or Maybe Not: A
Reevaluation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act After Three Decades, 19 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 83, 110 (2011).
129. Id. at 87.
130. Id. at 123.
131. Id. at 124.
132. Id. at 87.
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A. The Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act:
An Incomplete Solution
Recognizing the “significant divide” among the states as to the
ability of courts to modify or set aside premarital agreements for
unfairness at the time of enforcement, the Uniform Law Commission
began promulgating the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreement
Act (UPMAA) in July of 2012. 133 Its overall goal was to “produce an
act that would promote informed decision-making and procedural
fairness without undermining interests in contractual autonomy,
predictability, and reliance.” 134
First, section 9(e) of the UPMAA would allow the court to
invalidate a spousal support waiver if enforcement “causes a party to
the agreement to be eligible for support under a program of public
assistance at the time of separation or marital dissolution.”135
Although the drafters assert that section 9(e) attempts to give
vulnerable parties “protections far beyond what was given in the
original Uniform Premarital Agreement Act” of 1983, 136 its language
is derived almost word for word from the spousal support waiver
provision in the 1932 act, 137 which the California Legislature already
rejected in 1983. 138 More importantly, however, Section 9(e) does
not conform to existing public policy, given that “spousal support
awards in California are based on the marital standard of living, not
on an amount that would keep the supported spouse off public

133. Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital and Marital
Agreements, 46 FAM. L.Q. 313, 314–15 (2012).
134. Id. at 315.
135. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(e), 9C U.L.A. 12 (Supp. 2014).
(“If a premarital agreement or marital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support and the
modification or elimination causes a party to the agreement to be eligible for support under a
program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital dissolution, a court, on request of
that party, may require the other party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that
eligibility.”).
136. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9 cmt., 9C U.L.A. 25 (Supp.
2014).
137. Section 9(e) of the UPMAA is adapted from section 6(b) of the UPAA, which states:
If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support and
that modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for
support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital
dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, may require the other
party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that eligibility.
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b), 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983).
138. See supra Part II.B; see also Goldberg, supra note 34, at 1245–46 (“[California] did not
adopt wholeheartedly the ‘freedom of contract’ philosophy evinced by [the UPAA].”).
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assistance.” 139
The second UPMAA provision, section 9(f), would allow a
court to:
[R]efuse . . . a term of a premarital or marital agreement if,
in the context of the agreement as a whole: (1) the term was
unconscionable at the time of signing; or (2) enforcement of
the term would result in substantial hardship for a party
because of a material change in circumstances arising after
the agreement was signed. 140
The first part of this provision has already been incorporated in
California law on premarital agreements. 141 The second part
resembles the approach adopted by the State of Illinois, where courts
are permitted to order spousal support if enforcement of the support
waiver would cause “undue hardship” to one party because of
“circumstances not reasonably foreseeable at the time of execution”
of the agreement. 142 The UPMAA provision, however, does not
require that the change in circumstances was unforeseeable, but only
that the change was “material” and that it resulted in “substantial”
hardship.
Although the second part of section 9(f) seems to provide a clear
and balanced standard for determining the enforceability of a spousal
support waiver, it neglects to consider some policy considerations
discussed earlier. What if, for instance, Jane signed a premarital
agreement waiving spousal support while she was unemployed, and
she remained unemployed until the divorce twenty years later?
Unable to find employment at fifty years old and with no assets to
her name, Jane is likely to meet the “substantial hardship”
requirement under section 9(f). But has there been a “material
change in circumstances” as required by the section? Is Jane’s aging
of twenty years a “material change?” As illustrated by this example,
139. Goldberg, supra note 34, at 1249 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320 (West 2014) (“In
ordering spousal support under this part, the court shall consider all of the following
circumstances: consider all of the following: (a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each
party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage . . . .”)).
“[T]he major thrust of recent California spousal support legislation is to enable a former spouse to
become self-supporting and not rely on support from either the state or an ex-spouse.” Id.
140. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(f), 9C U.L.A. 23, (Supp. 2014).
141. See FAM. § 1615(a) (“A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against
whom enforcement is sought proves . . . the agreement was unconscionable when it was
executed . . . .”).
142. Oldham, supra note 128, at 110.
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section 9(f) may not protect against a “substantial hardship” that did
not arise out of a “material change in circumstances arising after the
agreement was signed.” 143
As applied to Facter, this change-in-circumstances approach, by
itself, would likely have favored enforcement of the spousal support
waiver, contrary to the court’s ruling. There was no material change
in circumstances apparent in Facter. Nancy quit her job before the
marriage, and she was still unemployed at divorce sixteen years
later. 144 Even if their having a child (as they planned) 145 can be
characterized as a material change in circumstances, it would be
difficult to argue that Nancy would experience “substantial hardship”
after receiving $200,000, a Jaguar sedan, and half of the multimillion-dollar home. 146 The set of guidelines proposed in the
following section incorporates this change-in-circumstances
approach into a larger framework for determining enforceability of
spousal support waivers in premarital agreements.
B. Proposed Guidelines: A Comprehensive Approach
Subsection (c) of Family Code section 1612 states that “[a]ny
provision in a premarital agreement regarding spousal support,
including, but not limited to, a waiver of it, is not enforceable if . . .
the provision regarding spousal support is unconscionable at the time
of enforcement.” 147 As previously discussed, this rule, without clear
guidelines for determining unconscionability, allows courts to
arbitrarily evaluate the substantive fairness of spousal support
waivers. This author proposes two additional provisions (the
“Guidelines”) for legislative or judicial adoption, which are adapted
from section 7.05 of the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:
Analysis and Recommendations drafted by the American Law
Institute. 148 The bifurcated approach under the Guidelines first
requires the party challenging enforcement to show that public policy
concerns exist to justify the court’s substantive review of the waiver,
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(f), 9C U.L.A. 23, (Supp. 2014).
See In re Marriage of Facter, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79, 84–87 (Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 85.
Id. at 93.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (West 2014).
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.05 CMT. A (2002). Guidelines 1 and 2 are based on subsections 2 and 3
of section 7.05 of the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution. “Substantial injustice” is
replaced with “unconscionability” and “agreement” is replaced with “waiver” in the Guidelines.
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and then requires the court to consider a non-exhaustive set of factors
when deciding whether or not a waiver of spousal support is
unconscionable at the time of enforcement.
The Guidelines provide as follows:
(1) A court may consider whether a provision regarding
spousal support is unconscionable at the time of
enforcement if, and only if, the party resisting its
enforcement shows that one or more of the following
have occurred since the time of the waiver’s execution:
(a) more than ten years have passed since the
execution of the waiver;
(b) a child was born to, or adopted by, the parties;
(c) there has been a material change in circumstances
that has a substantial impact on one of the parties
or their children.
(2) In deciding whether a provision regarding spousal
support is unconscionable at the time of enforcement, a
court must consider all of the following:
(a) the magnitude of the disparity between the
outcome if the waiver is enforced and the outcome
under otherwise prevailing law;
(b) for those marriages of limited duration in which it
is practical to ascertain, the difference between the
circumstances of the objecting party if the waiver
is enforced, and that party’s likely circumstances
had the marriage never taken place;
(c) whether the purpose of the waiver was to benefit
or protect the interests of third parties (such as
children from a prior relationship), whether that
purpose is still relevant, and whether the waiver’s
terms were reasonably designed to serve it; and
(d) the impact of the agreement’s enforcement upon
the children of the parties.
The legislative or judicial consideration of these Guidelines
would allow California courts to strike an appropriate balance
between freedom of contract and policy considerations when
evaluating the substantive fairness of a premarital waiver of spousal
support. The remainder of this Article identifies the policy goals
achieved under each part of the Guidelines and applies them to the
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factual circumstances in Facter to illustrate that, had the court
adopted the Guidelines, it would have arrived at the same conclusion,
but with significantly more guidance and justification for its finding
of unconscionability.
1. A Policy-Based Threshold Requirement
Section (1) of the Guidelines operates as a threshold requirement
that must be satisfied before the court is permitted to evaluate a
spousal support waiver for unconscionability at the time of divorce.
Perhaps this section of the Guidelines is the more important of the
two, given that it effectively requires the party resisting enforcement
to show that public policy concerns exist to warrant the court’s
review of the substantial fairness of an otherwise valid contractual
term.
Only one of the three conditions under Section (1) must be
satisfied before the court can evaluate whether a spousal support
waiver is unconscionable at the time of enforcement. Each condition
reflects certain policy considerations embedded in existing California
law. For instance, subsection (a) requires that more than ten years
have passed since the execution of the waiver. This condition is
adapted from section 4336(b) of the Family Code, which provides
that “[f]or the purpose of retaining jurisdiction, there is a
presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence that a
marriage of 10 years or more, from the date of marriage to the date
of separation, is a marriage of long duration.” 149 Subsection (a) of
the Guidelines promotes marriages of long duration and, thereby,
conforms to the state policy in favor of marriage (and against
dissolution).
The condition set forth under subsection (b) is satisfied if the
marriage produces a child, including through adoption. Underlying
this condition is the state’s policy of protecting the interests of
children in the marriage reflected in Family Code section 4320(g),
which requires courts to consider “[t]he ability of the supported party
to engage in gainful employment without unduly interfering with the
interests of dependent children in the custody of the party.” 150
Subsection (c) incorporates the “change-of-circumstances”
approach under section 9(f) of the UPMAA, which allows courts to
149. FAM. § 4336(b).
150. Id. § 4320(g).
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invalidate a spousal support waiver if its enforcement would lead to
“substantial hardship for a party because of a material change in
circumstances arising after the agreement was signed.” 151 However,
because Section (1) of the Guidelines operates as a threshold
requirement, subsection (c) sets a lower bar than the UPMAA by
requiring only that a “substantial impact,” rather than “substantial
hardship,” resulted from a material change in circumstances. By
making it easier to meet this condition, subsection (c) adheres to the
policy goal of protecting spousal support embodied in the current
statute. 152
2. A Clear Set of Factors
Section (2) of the Guidelines identifies four factors for a court to
consider only after it has satisfied the threshold requirement under
the first section. The factors under (2)(a) and (2)(b) attempt to
promote the policy goal of equitable distribution by requiring courts
to ensure that both parties share equally the benefits, and burdens, of
the divorce 153 Subsection (a) considers the magnitude of the disparity
between the outcome if the support waiver is enforced and the
outcome without such waiver. Under subsection (b), if the marriage
is of limited duration (less than ten years under California law 154),
the court must consider the difference between the circumstances of
the waiving party if the waiver is enforced, and that party’s likely
circumstances had the marriage never taken place.
The factors under (2)(c) and (2)(d) operate as a second layer of
safeguards, supplementing section (1)(b) of the Guidelines, to protect
children from the effects of a spousal support waiver. Like section
(1)(b), these factors conform to the state policy of protecting the
interests of children embedded in existing California law, such as
section 4320(2)(g) of the Family Code quoted above.

151. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(f), 9C U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 2014).
152. See Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 10 (“[S]pousal support, and the role that it can
play at the time a marriage is ending, is worthy of some special protection.”).
153. See Michelle Murray, Alimony as an Equalizing Force in Divorce, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 313, 314 (1997) (“[S]ome jurisdictions consider alimony to serve the purpose of
supplementing or assisting with the equal or equitable division of intangible marital property.”);
Krauskopf, supra note 107, at 256 (“[T]he purpose of court-ordered economic settlement at
marriage dissolution is to achieve a fair sharing of the benefits and burdens of the marriage
measurable in dollars.”).
154. FAM. § 4336(b).
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C. Applying the Guidelines to Facter
The factual circumstances in Facter would have satisfied the
threshold requirements under section (1) of the Guidelines, thereby
giving the court jurisdiction to consider whether Nancy’s waiver of
spousal support was unconscionable at the time of enforcement. The
Facters had been married for approximately sixteen years when
divorce proceedings were initiated, 155 well over the ten-year
benchmark in subsection (a). Additionally, their marriage produced a
son, 156 which satisfies subsection (b).
Also, had the Facter court considered the factors set forth in
section (2) of the Guidelines, the court would likely have reached the
same decision to refuse to enforce the spousal support waiver. For
instance, section (2)(a) incorporates the court’s mathematical
approach in Facter. Judge Marguilles calculated the total amount that
Nancy would have received had the waiver been enforced, and then
compared it to the amount of Jeffrey’s assets and annual income. 157
As required under section (2)(a) of the Guidelines, the court
considered the magnitude of disparity between the outcome if the
waiver was enforced and the outcome without the waiver, concluding
that “[c]ompared to what [Nancy] is likely to receive in courtordered spousal support, these assets are manifestly inadequate.” 158
As to section (2)(b) of the Guidelines, the court considered the
difference between the circumstances if the agreement was enforced
and the circumstances if the marriage had never taken place. Instead
of “pursu[ing] her education or seek[ing] gainful employment,”
Nancy “devoted her efforts to child rearing and maintaining the
family home, while Jeffrey continued to successfully pursue a
financially rewarding career.” 159 Thus under the Guidelines, the
court would have similarly concluded that if the spousal support
waiver was enforced, “Nancy will never come close to replicating
the marital standard of living.” 160
Although the court did not consider whether the Facters’
agreement was intended or designed to benefit or protect third parties
155. The parties were married in 1994 and separated in 2010. In re Marriage of Facter, 152
Cal. Rptr. 3d 79, 82 (Ct. App. 2013).
156. Id. at 83 (“The marriage produced a son, who was born in March 1996.”).
157. See id. at 93.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 92.
160. Id. at 93.
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(section 2(c) of the Guidelines), doing so would only have supported
the court’s decision to refuse enforcement of the support waiver.
Jeffrey was simply “afraid of marriage because he had worked hard
all his life and had earned a lot of money, and wanted all that he had
earned prior to marriage to be protected” and “did not want to have
any continuing financial obligations to [Nancy] if their marriage
ended.” 161 He did not intend for the agreement to protect any thirdparties. Nancy had two children from a prior marriage 162 that ended
with disputes regarding support and attorney fees. 163 It would be
difficult to argue, however, that Nancy intended to protect or benefit
her two children by agreeing to waive her rights to spousal support.
Therefore, the court’s consideration of this section 2(c) of the
Guidelines would have weighed in favor of non-enforcement.
The Facter court did not expressly consider the impact of the
enforcement on Nancy and Jeffrey’s son. However, the court
acknowledged the fact that Nancy intended to be a “stay-at-home
mom” 164 to “devote her efforts to child rearing and maintaining the
family home,” 165 and that she “will never come close to replicating
the marital standard of living” if the spousal support waiver were
enforced. 166 As such, it can be inferred that Nancy’s marital standard
of living included adequate and proper care for their son, which,
according to the court, would certainly be affected by enforcement of
the agreement. Therefore, had the court considered the effect of
enforcement on Jeffery and Nancy’s son, as required in Guideline
2(d), it would still have likely concluded that enforcement of waiver
would be unconscionable.
Had the Court of Appeals in Facter applied the Guidelines
proposed by this author, not only would the court have reached the
same decision (that Nancy’s waiver of spousal support was
unconscionable at the time of enforcement), the court would have set
forth a clear, policy-based approach to determining unconscionability
within the meaning of section 1612(c) of the Family Code.

161. Id. at 85–86.
162. See id. at 84.
163. Id. at 86 n.11 (“Nancy testified that her previous marriage had lasted for eight years.
When she got divorced, she and her former husband went through the court system. During the
proceedings, there were disputes regarding support and attorney fees.”).
164. Id. at 85.
165. Id. at 92.
166. Id. at 93.
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VI. CONCLUSION
California courts and the Legislature have an opportunity to
clarify an ambiguity in its existing family law. Section 1612(c) of the
Family Code prohibits enforcement of premarital waivers of spousal
support that are “unconscionable at the time of enforcement,” 167 but
it remains unclear what this phrase actually means. Without a clear
standard for determining what makes a support waiver
unconscionable, courts have unrestricted and unguided jurisdiction to
evaluate the substantial fairness of a private, contractual term
between spouses. The judicial or legislative adoption of the
Guidelines proposed by this author would strike an appropriate
balance between freedom of contract and the policies embodied in
existing family law.

167. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (West 2014).

